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ABSTRACT
This Article advocates consideration of the United
Kingdom’s jurisprudence as persuasive authority for
implementation of a new framework for analysis of subject
matter eligibility of computer-implemented inventions in
light of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The U.K.’s patent
jurisprudence provides a more developed and clear
analytic framework that conforms to the policy objectives
of Alice, while also avoiding the conceptual problem of
determining what is “abstract.” The result is a more useful
and concrete analytic framework that also reduces conflicts
of laws, and thus can help spur innovation across the
Atlantic.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank International1 places patentability analysis of computerimplemented inventions on a parallel path with that of the United
Kingdom (U.K.) and the European Union. Both the bench and bar
can benefit from reviewing the U.K.’s jurisprudence as persuasive
authority when considering implementation of a new framework
for analysis of computer-implemented inventions in light of Alice.
The U.K.’s patent jurisprudence provides a more developed
analytic framework that conforms to Alice. More importantly, use
of the U.K.’s analytic approach would avoid the pitfall of inviting
1

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).

2014]

GETTING BEYOND ABSTRACT CONFUSION: U.K. PATENT
ELIGIBILITY JURISPRUDENCE AND ALICE V. CLS BANK

139

formulaic application and claim drafting to circumvent Alice’s
requirements.
This Article first briefly reviews subject-matter patentability of
computer-implemented inventions in the United States. Next, this
Article outlines the framework of patent eligibility in the U.K.,
contrasting that approach with the requirements set forth in Alice.
Finally, this Article discusses both practical and policy benefits of
considering the European jurisprudence as persuasive authority in
developing a more concrete analytic framework in light of Alice’s
holding.
I. PATENT ELIGIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The law relative to patentable subject matter in the United
States starts with defining patentable subject matter; exceptions are
then carved out. This procedure has presented certain challenges,
specifically with respect to computer-implemented inventions.
A. Statutory Basis
The statute defining patentable subject matter has remained
relatively unchanged since 1793.2 Over 220 years ago, the
prevailing statute provided that a patent may be issued for “any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter
and any new and useful improvement on any art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter.”3
Today, the prevailing statute provides that a patent may be
issued for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.”4 Clearly, the legislature in the beginning of the industrial
age did not conceive a world of programmable digital computers.
The task of shaping the law to fit evolving times has been
accomplished by judicial construct.
2

Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23 (Feb. 21, 1793) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952)).
3
Id. at 319.
4
35 U.S.C. §101 (1952).
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B. Down the Rabbit Hole
Judicial exceptions to patentability include natural organisms,5
methods of employing laws of nature,6 legal contracts and entities,7
printed matter,8 transmitted signals,9 and software per se.10
Relative to methods, the Supreme Court held in Bilski v. Kappos
that methods directed to “abstract ideas” are not patentable.11 What
is deemed to be an “abstract idea” has yet to be precisely defined.
C. Bilski and the Pool of Tears
After the Bilski ruling, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (U.S.P.T.O.) established guidance for weighing various
factors for and against patentability of process claims.12 However,
the complicated analysis could be rendered moot by formulistic
claim drafting, especially with computer-implemented methods.
Establishing patent eligibility under this analysis merely required
adequate reference to a “processor” and “memory.” Although their
value as disclosure was at best questionable, applications often
included figures and descriptions of generic computers to
implement methods. Moreover, though the distinction would not
produce a difference to a person of rudimentary familiarity with
the art relative to computing technology, applications have
routinely directed separate and mirror claims to the method, system
and media implementing the same invention–with each section
5

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
Mayo Collaborative Servs., et al. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012).
7
In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (M.P.E.P.) § 2106 (2014).
8
In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
9
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
10
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).
11
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
12
Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Patent
Examination Policy, U.S.P.T.O., to the Patent Examining Corps, on Interim
Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View
of Bilski v. Kappos (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_27jul2010.pdf.
6
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accorded a different analysis for subject matter eligibility by the
U.S.P.T.O.
D. “Abstract Ideas,” the Caucus Race, and a Long Tale
The lack of clarity as to what exactly constitutes an “abstract
idea” has caused much confusion. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc on appeal in CLS
Bank International v. Alice Corp., 13 aptly illustrated the problem
by producing seven different opinions by ten judges on the issue
with no opinion supported by a majority.
On review, the United States Supreme Court took a great stride
in applying the analysis set forth in Mayo v. Prometheus,14 holding
that mere recitation of a generic computer does not, in itself, make
a method patent-eligible.15 Furthermore, the Court clarified that
patent-eligibility does not depend on formulaic drafting of claims;
the method, system, and medium claims of an invention stand and
fall together.16 Unfortunately, the Court also declared “we need not
labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category
in this case.”17
E. The Rabbit Sends a Little Bill
Similar to what it did after Bilski, the U.S.P.T.O. released
guidance faithfully outlining the general application of the analysis
the Supreme Court outlined in Alice.18 The analysis follows two
steps: first, determine if the claim is directed to “an abstract

13

717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). Prior to the holding in Alice, the analysis set forth
in Mayo was applied only in biotechnology or related arts. In applying the
analysis to computer-implemented arts, the Court extended application of the
Mayo analysis to all art areas.
15
Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 at 2359.
16
Id. at 2362–63.
17
Id. at 2356.
18
Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent
Examination Policy, to the Patent Examining Corps (June 25, 2014), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf.
14
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idea.”19 Non-limiting examples of “abstract ideas,” such as “[a]n
idea of itself” are provided.20 Next, if the claim is found to include
an “abstract idea,” then there is a requirement for “something
significantly more,” such as improvements to another technology
or to the functioning of the computer itself, in order to receive
patent protection.21 In this regard, “any element, or combination of
elements, in the claim” may be sufficient.22
While the results are not yet apparent, it is likely that the new
analytic framework will simply result in routine drafting
manipulations aimed at overcoming the Alice hurdle. As with the
Bilski analysis, where the complicated weighing of factors became
a moot issue by simply drafting a claim to reference a generic
processor, the current framework invites making the discovery of
“abstract ideas” moot by simply drafting a claim to reference
generic steps that “improve[e] . . . the functioning of the computer
itself.”23
For example, software applications universally function by
reserving memory space in a computer. Best practices in computer
programming require that reserved memory space be released after
use. Arguably, releasing reserved memory space in a computer
“improves” the computer by allowing the memory to be used for
other purposes. Similarly, most software applications are installed
using an installation package that readies the generic computer for
installation of said software by checking for incompatibilities and
making required changes. Thus, the steps undertaken in the
installation process and other computer processes “improve” the
computer by ensuring that it can execute the installed software or
other procedure. Database-driven processes routinely require
manipulation and configuration of resources to ensure better
performance which, if claimed, can be argued to “improve” the
computer’s performance in interacting with the database.
Defragmenting a disk drive can be viewed to “improve” the
19

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3. No definition is provided as to what is or is not, exactly, “an idea
of itself.”
21
Id. Examples of what constitutes “something more” are non-limiting.
22
Id. (emphasis added).
23
Id.
20
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computer by improving the disk drive, and thereby the computer’s
performance.
Recitation of such steps (which may represent little more than
technical best practices) and incorporation of such generic material
into specifications, while providing little value as a disclosure, may
well be able to provide enough to pass the new subject-matter
eligibility requirements as put forth by the Alice guidance. The
result might not be significantly different from the bare claim
reference to a generic processor and memory, which was employed
to overcome the requirements under Bilski.24
F. Advice from a Caterpillar
Patent practitioners in the U.K. may notice some familiar
concepts in the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Alice.
While there is much discussion of “abstract ideas” in Alice, the key
teaching, as it relates to computer-implemented inventions, is more
subtly stated.
First, the Court in Alice provides an approving nod to
Gottschalk v. Benson.25 Gottschalk establishes that a computer
program, in itself, is not patent-eligible.26 We know that computerimplemented inventions function by programming or software. As
Alice now clarifies, that implementation by a generic computer, in
itself, does not make the invention patent-eligible; it naturally
follows that an invention implemented by programming or
software inherently involves an abstract idea. Therefore, for any
computer-implemented invention where the computer is generic,
the first step of the Alice analysis is complete—i.e., the abstract
idea is identified. The software is the “abstract idea” that fulfills
the first step of the analysis. Thus, with the first step of the analysis
summarily completed, one can turn to the second step of the Alice
analysis to identify “something significantly more.”
The second step necessitates “a search for an ‘inventive
24

See Memorandum from Bahr, supra note 12. Recitation of a machine
provides a factor weighing towards subject matter eligibility.
25
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
26
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).
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concept.’”27 It is here that evaluating the European and, more
specifically, the U.K.’s approach to the question of patenteligibility can be informative as to developing a more concrete
framework of analysis to meet the requirement put forth by Alice.
II. EUROPE AND THE U.K.’S APPROACH
In contrast to the approach in the United States, which defines
eligible subject matter and then provides exceptions, the European
approach initially excludes items that should not be patentable
subject matter.28 Despite the different starting points, the two
approaches have now substantially converged.
A. Statutory Basis
In compliance with the European Patent Convention, and
specifically in relation to computer-implemented inventions, the
prevailing statute governing patentable subject matter in the U.K.
provides:
It is hereby declared that the following (among
other things) are not inventions for the purposes of
this Act, that is to say, anything which consists of –
...
(c) a scheme, rule or method of performing a
mental act, playing a game or doing business, or
27

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2353 (“We have described step two of this analysis as
a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements
that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’”).
28
European Patent Convention art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, E.P.C. 110 (2013)
(“The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions . . .: (a)
discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic
creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing
games or doing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of
information”), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/
epc/2013/e/ar52.html. Other policy exclusions, such as medical methods, are
also provided in Art. 53; however, detailed discussion of such lies outside of the
current scope of this Article.
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a program for a computer;
...
but the foregoing provision shall prevent anything
from being treated as an invention for the purposes
of this Act only to the extent that a patent or
application for a patent relates to that thing as
such.29
B. The Analytic Framework
Determination of subject-matter eligibility requires a four-step
analysis, as clarified by the England and Wales Court of Appeals
in Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd. (the Aerotel approach):
1. Properly construe the claims;
2. Identify the actual (or alleged) contribution;
3. Ask whether it falls solely within the excluded
subject matter; and
4. Check whether the actual or alleged contribution
is actually technical in nature.30
In this light, when interpreting whether a computer program makes
a “contribution that is actually technical in nature,” one must
consider five aspects:
1. Whether the claimed technical effect has a
technical effect on a process which is carried on
outside of the computer;
2. Whether the claimed technical effect operates at
the level of the architecture of the computer–that is
to say, whether the effect is produced irrespective of
the data being processed or the application being
29

Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 1(2)(c) (U.K.), available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf.
30
Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [40]
(Eng.).
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run;
3. Whether the claimed technical effect results in
the computer being made to operate in a new way;
4. Whether the program made the computer a better
computer in the sense of running more efficiently
and effectively as a computer; and
5. Whether the perceived problem is overcome by
the claimed invention as opposed to merely being
circumvented.31
The United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office further explains
the underlying policy as follows:
Some computer-implemented inventions are
patentable whilst others are not. This is because
software straddles the technological and business
worlds. It uses technology, that is, computers, but
often for non-technical purposes. Whether a
computer-implemented invention is patentable
depends on the contribution the invention makes.
For example, if it provides improved control of a
car braking system, it is likely to be patentable, but
if it merely provides an improved accounting
system, it is probably not patentable.32
It may be readily noticed that the policy objectives and analytical
framework employed in the U.K. seems to echo the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in Alice. The concurrence invites a deeper
analysis.

31

HTC Europe Co. Ltd. v. Apple Inc., [2013] EWCA (Civ) 451, [50]
(Eng.).
32
Press Release, The U.K. Patent Office, Patent Office issues Practice
Notice on Patentability of Computer Programs and Business Methods (Dec. 23,
2006), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/press/press-release/press-release-2006/press-release20061103.htm.
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C. Concurrence with Alice
The two steps of the Alice analysis are strikingly similar to the
last two steps of the Aerotel approach. Specifically, in the third
step, the Aerotel approach asks “whether the claims fall within
excluded subject matter (i.e., are ‘abstract’),” and in the fourth step
inquires into whether the alleged contribution is “actually technical
in nature.”33
Here, the factors that Alice considers as “significantly more” in
the second step of the analysis (i.e., improvements to another
technology or technical field, or improvements to the functioning
of the computer itself)34 are echoed in the Aerotel approach
considerations as outlined in HTC Europe (i.e. “technical effect on
a process which is carried on outside of the computer,” or “results
in the computer being made to operate in a new way . . . made the
computer a better computer in the sense of running more
efficiently and effectively as a computer.”).35
D. The Conflict with U.S.P.T.O. Guidance
A key distinction is that, whereas the Aerotel approach requires
that the “technical effect” relate to “the actual or alleged
contribution” of the disclosed invention, the current guidance put
forth by the U.S.P.T.O. states that “any element, or combination of
elements, in the claim” may be sufficient to provide subject matter
eligibility.36 As such, the U.S.P.T.O. guidance also misconstrues
Alice.
Specifically, the Court in Alice clarified that the second step
necessitates “a search for an ‘inventive concept.’”37 By then
33

Aerotel, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [40].
Id.
35
HTC Europe, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 451 at [50].
36
See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld to the Patent Examining
Corps, supra note 18, at 3 (emphasis added).
37
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014) (“We have
described step two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e.,
an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’”).
34
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allowing “any element,” irrespective of whether the element
directly relates to the “inventive concept,” to be sufficient in the
Alice analysis, the “search for the inventive concept” is rendered
moot and irrelevant. Moreover, as discussed above, consideration
of “any element” also invites the sort of formulaic and ancillary
claim drafting derided by the Court in Alice “Such a result would
make the determination of patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the
draftsman’s art.’”38
III. DEVELOPING A CONCRETE ALICE FRAMEWORK
The similarity in both analytic framework and policy objectives
of the well-developed Aerotel approach to the Alice analysis
provides an opportunity to look to the U.K.’s jurisprudence as
persuasive authority. Doing so would also advance the laudable
goal of reducing international inconsistencies relative to patent
subject-matter eligibility.
A. Identification of the Actual (or Alleged) Contribution
The Court in Alice mandated looking beyond the claims of the
patent and evaluating the “inventive concept” in making a
determination as to subject matter eligibility.39 In this light,
identification of the “inventive concept” should be included in a
properly applied Alice analytic framework. The Aerotel approach
could be instructive in this regard.
As to the identification of the inventive contribution, Lord
Justice Jacob provided in Aerotel: “[I]t is an exercise in judgment
probably involving the problem said to be solved, how the
invention works, what its advantages are. What has the inventor
really added to human knowledge perhaps best sums up the
exercise. The formulation involves looking at substance not
form.”40 The statement fits well into the discussion provided in
38

Id. at 2359 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)); see also
id. at 2349, 2357, 2364.
39
Id. at 2353, 2357–58.
40
Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [40]
(Eng.).
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Alice. Moreover, in the United States patent practitioners and
examiners have the tools at hand to assist in the identification of
the inventive concept because applicants are required to provide an
abstract as a part of their disclosure.41 The abstract should provide
“the nature and gist of the technical disclosure and should include
that which is new in the art.”42 This correlates directly to the
determination of what the inventor “really added to human
knowledge.”43
Applicants should also provide a background and summary of
the invention.44 The background should include “the problems
involved in the prior art or other information disclosed which are
solved by the applicant’s invention,”45 and the summary should
“set out the exact nature, operation, and purpose of the
invention.”46 These correlate directly to the determination of “the
problem said to be solved, how the invention works, and what its
advantages are.”47
A regretfully common practice among patent practitioners in
the United States is regurgitating claim language in the abstract
and summary. Such practice not only subverts the requirements set
forth in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (M.P.E.P.)48
and adds mere surplusage, but also devalues the disclosure and
makes proper identification of the “inventive concept” unduly
burdensome. As such, encouraging more frequent issuance and
maintenance of objections to improper abstract and summary
should be considered.

41

37 C.F.R. § 1.72 (2014); M.P.E.P. § 608.01(b) (2014).
M.P.E.P. § 608.01(b) (2014).
43
Aerotel, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [43].
44
37 C.F.R. 1.73 (2014); M.P.E.P. § 608.01(c), (d) (2014).
45
M.P.E.P. § 608.01(c) (2014).
46
Id. § 608.01(d).
47
See Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [43]
(Eng.).
48
The M.P.E.P. is published by the U.S.P.T.O. and outlines the laws and
regulations that must be followed in the examination of patent applications in
the United States. A current copy of the M.P.E.P. may be accessed at:
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/.
42
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B. Direct Connection of “Significantly More” with “Inventive
Concept”
The Court in Alice noted that the second step of the analysis
involves identification of the “inventive concept.”49 The
requirement of connecting the “inventive concept” to the
“something more” is illustrated in the Court’s discussion of
Diehr.50 In the discussion, the Court points out the “inventive
concept”—in this case, “to record constant temperature
measurements inside the rubber mold—something ‘the industry
ha[d] not been able to obtain.’”51 The steps of recalculating the
cure time by computer—i.e., the formula—were transformed in
connection with “something more” that “the industry had not been
able to obtain”—i.e., the “inventive concept.”52 Thus, Alice
requires a direct connection of the “significantly more” to the
“inventive concept.”53
C. Consideration Provides Both Practical and Policy Advantages
In consideration of the analysis, results, and policy objectives
of the Aerotel approach and those outlined or inferred by the Court
in Alice, review of the jurisprudence of U.K. as a persuasive
authority may be useful. Doing so would yield several notable
advantages.
As noted by the Intellectual Property Office, there is extensive

49

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We have
described step two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e.,
an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’”).
50
See id. at 2358–59.
51
Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178 & n.3 (1981)).
52
See id. at 2359.
53
Note the similarity in the narrative provided by the U.K. Patent Office:
“Whether a computer-implemented invention is patentable depends on the
contribution the invention makes. For example, if it provides improved control
of a car braking system, it is likely to be patentable.” Press Release, U.K. Patent
Office, supra note 32.
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case law about computer-implemented inventions in the U.K.54
The Aerotel approach has been used and developed in that
jurisdiction since 2006.55 This provides an extensive source of
information relative to a very similar standard to that required by
Alice.
Additionally, the analytic approach in the U.K. is more
concrete in structure, while fitting into the framework of Alice.
This allows the advantage of considering the approaches of U.K.
jurisprudence as potentially instructive where the U.S. law is still
less evolved. Doing so would allow the findings to be tested and
tried in the course of development of U.S. authority.
Finally, although individual countries in the European Union
may have slightly varying interpretations on the law as it relates to
subject matter patentability of computer-implemented inventions,
they are generally in conformance with each other.56 Therefore,
using the opportunity presented by Alice to further develop the law
in the United States by considering the parallel approach in the
U.K. would reduce the conflict of laws as it relates to patenteligibility of computer-implemented inventions. Both invention
and utilization of computer-implemented technologies are global in
nature. Reduction of the conflict in laws governing patenteligibility of such transatlantic innovation will likely reduce costs
and spur innovation.
CONCLUSION
The U.K.’s law and jurisprudence relative to patent eligibility
of computer-implemented innovation is strikingly similar to and
fits within the framework of analysis mandated by the United
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International. Both the bench and bar in the United States would
benefit from looking to the U.K. as a source of persuasive
authority. Doing so would yield benefits of faster development of
law in the United States by employing and testing best practices
developed in the U.K. since 2006. Additionally, moving towards
54

Press Release, U.K. Patent Office, supra note 32.
Press Release, U.K. Patent Office, supra note 32.
56
Press Release, U.K. Patent Office, supra note 32.
55
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greater uniformity of laws across the Atlantic, as is now possible
with Alice, would reduce conflict of laws and thus spur innovation.

